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Optimizing Public Transportation Management through Differential Gaming to Align Demand Control with Service Efficiency |
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PP: 347-355 |
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doi:10.18576/amis/200204
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Author(s) |
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Hesham Diab,
Shimaa Atef,
Essam El-Seidy,
E. A. Elsakhawy,
M. E. Tabarak,
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Abstract |
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| Public transportation systems face the dual challenge of improving service quality while managing demand to prevent overuse or under-utilization. In this paper, we develop a differential game model to represent the interactions between two key players: the public transportation management (service provider) and demand regulators. The service provider aims to enhance service quality and system efficiency, while demand regulators focus on controlling excessive demand. Each player uses control strategies that influence the state of the system over time, represented by congestion levels or service utilization. We derive optimal strategies for both players using Hamiltonian functions and evaluate their performance through numerical simulations. Our results reveal how balancing these conflicting objectives can lead to a more efficient and cost-effective public transportation system.
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