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Strictly Alternating Three-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Different Memory-Length |
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PP: 1117-1132 |
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doi:10.18576/amis/200420
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Author(s) |
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Marwa Sameh,
Essam El-Seidy,
Aya Rabie,
Shimaa Atef,
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Abstract |
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| The study of cooperation through the Prisoner’s Dilemma has yielded fundamental insights, yet real-world dilemmas often involve multiple participants interacting in turn and with differing cognitive capacities, such as varying memory lengths. To address how these factors jointly shape cooperation, this work introduces a three-player alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma model. Contests are analyzed between distinct strategy classes that extend Tit-for-Tat logic under different memory capacities. Through evolutionary simulations supported by graphical and numerical analysis, the most successful strategies and the highest achievable payoffs are identified, revealing the direct impact of memory length on outcomes. Furthermore, the role of player relatedness in modulating strategic behavior and performance within this complex environment is examined. |
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