

Detection, Prevention and Mitigation of Wormhole Attack in Wireless Adhoc Network by Coordinator

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Abstract: The adhoc networks are the briefly established wireless networks that don't need to be mounted infrastructure it's conjointly called as infrastructure less network. These adhoc networks share a common wireless medium and lack central coordination which makes them more liable to attacks when compared to wired network. In case of wormhole wireless attack, the intruder senses the packets in terms of bits and tunnels them (possibly selectively) from one location to a different location. It then send back them into the network. Such wormhole attacks can be a significant threat against location-based wireless security systems and adhoc networks per se. In an attempt to find the solution over wormhole attack, the dynamic information of the packets can be changed which provides a strong protection. In order to tackle wormhole attack coordinator node has been elected by wireless election algorithms. Functions of the coordinator node are to observe, isolate and prevent any further attacks. In this context, the simulation experiments were carried out to check the performance under different situations. From these experiment results, we have identified that the suggested wireless protocol is adapted for improving the protection of resource constrained wireless sensor networks.

Keywords: adhoc, Attack, defender, Wireless, Wormhole attack.

1 Introduction

A wireless adhoc network or MANET may be a decentralized kind of wireless network. The network is adhoc since it does not admit a preexisting infrastructure, like routers in wired networks or access points in managed (infrastructure) wireless networks. As an alternative, every node partakes in routing by forwarding information for different nodes, therefore the determination of those nodes forward information is created dynamically on the idea of network property and the routing algorithm in use. Mobile adhoc network (MANET) is a sort of adhoc network which has no infrastructure. It consists of a group of wireless mobile nodes which are capable of communicating with each other. They have dynamic topology i.e. they are free to move independently. Nodes join or leave the network whenever required. As the network has no infrastructure, it is vulnerable to several attacks [1].

Basically, the attack is outlined as a trial to disrupt the conventional functionality of the network. The attack also

violates the basic security goals like confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation [2]. There are two types of attack which are as follows:

- (1) Passive attack-that does not destroy or disrupt the network, but uses the useful information. This type of attack violates confidentiality.
- (2) Active attack-it captures, damages, influences the user data. This type of attack disrupts the operations of the network. Wormhole attack and black hole attacks are active attacks.

1.1 Wormhole Attack

Worm Hole attack consists of two nodes. The attacker nodes that are connected by a link primarily which is known as the tunnel. The attacker node on one side captures the packet from the legitimate node, encapsulates it and transmits through tunnel to the other attacker node or malicious node which are present within

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


Fig. 1: Wormhole Attack.

the network. It consists of one or two malicious nodes and a tunnel between them [3].

Wormhole nodes form an illusion of shorter route than the original route for the legitimate node. Fig. 1 shows the instance of wormhole. Figure illustrates two malicious nodes *A* and *B* connected with one another through a link, the link may be wired or wireless, the link is referred as tunnel, “the wormhole tunnel”. Through this tunnel the attacker nodes communicate with each other [4, 5].

The tunnel is formed via in-band channel or by out-of-band channel or through high transmission power. In Fig. 1 node 3 and node 7 are pictured as source and destination respectively. Therefore currently the source node 3 can forward the packet to the legitimate neighbor i.e.; node 2 during this way intermediate nodes between node 3 and node 7 i.e., 2, 6, 5 can forward the packet from source to destination. In the absence of malicious nodes, the legitimate path from node 3 to node 7 are 3–2–6–5–7 therefore number of hops the packet travels is 3 (three).

2 Literature Survey

The adhoc wireless sensor networks functions on low resource constraints of power, battery life, and bandwidth in an extremely hostile atmosphere. All of the proposed solutions to the wormhole attack don't seem to be surveillance to any or all sorts of wormhole attacks. The success of the wormhole attack is not dependent on cryptographic methodology but depends on its strength of the attack. Solutions which are based on the dependency of the cryptography are susceptible to wormhole replay attacks [6, 7]. However in these proposed method routing from different anomaly is protected throughout the data-forwarding section using the technique of One-Time Signature. In that two forms of taxonomy been addressed: (i) with malicious nodes which reveals their identity and (ii) which doesn't reveal their identity in wormholes.

They are certain limitation in sensors which meant be power restricted, bandwidth limitation and economic throwaway devices, that the solution for the interference of the attacks supported the antenna and therefore the global positioning system is insufficient for wireless sensor networks. The solution of the packet leases is used to reconcile the obstruction of packet based wormhole detection (in that the intruder uses a long directional antenna). This provision needs time consuming to achieve the task in wireless sensor networks, as it requires extra hardware. Nevertheless, modern investigations have emphasized the fact that a specific attack, termed as the wormhole attack, is capable of causing irreparable damage to the routing protocol. This susceptibility is present in a wireless system, and it is also likely to exist in adhoc commerce systems. Though several efforts have been made to face the wormhole attacks in the domain of wireless communications, the offered solutions seem to be insufficient, requiring further renovation [8, 9].

The analysis of the secure information of forwarding schemes and However, Public Key Certificates (PKCs) are needed for these protocols. It was to be emphasized that the certificate management was a profound procedure and that clients in the brokerage domain faced resource-crunch. There the excellent option was for the clients to delegate the relative duty to the broker. It was noted that the broker was a Trusted Third Party (TTP) and had sufficient resources. So, the broker was suitable for storing and managing PKCs. The latter part of their document tackled this dilemma, with special emphasis on the certificate status management that was the most intricate function of the certificate management [10].

Nodes are categorized based on dynamic behavior during the packet forwarding. By this misbehaved nodes will be avoided during transmission. The packet forwarding is based on route forwarding reply packet. In this work *r* information forwarding is highly viable to the protection breach and vulnerable to design problems like power limitation, information transfer & aggregation, and placement awareness [13, 14].

3 Detection and mitigation of wormhole attack using Wireless Election Algorithm

The proposed methodology concentrates on selecting a proper leader and mitigating the wormhole attack by using such leader. Since MANET has dynamic topology changes then elections have to be carried out by wireless election algorithm. The best leader or coordinators work is to find the path with the vulnerability that is a path with wormhole tunnel.

As and when the node has joined the network it has to request for the coordinator. If the node has coordinator already then the newly joined node has to register him with his configuration details to the coordinator. If the MANET




Fig. 2: Wireless Election Algorithms.

doesn't have the coordinator then the new election will be started by the newly joined node.

After the election has been completed as per Fig. 2 then the coordinator message will be forwarded to all the nodes in the network other than coordinator. By receiving coordinator message all other nodes have to send the acknowledgment message with the path information from each node to the coordinator. The coordinator's work is to examine the paths by the acknowledgment message. If there is a single tunnel path stay live means then it has to be isolated and notified to all other nodes in the network.

3.1 Coordinator Algorithms

The Coordinator algorithms used to detection and mitigation of wormhole attack. The steps in our coordinator algorithm are given below.

- Step 1: Perform the successful selection of coordinator.
- Step 2: Verify that no network without the coordinator.
- Step 3: After election mechanism coordinator message will be forwarded to all the other nodes in the network.
- Step 4: By receiving coordinator message all the other nodes have to send acknowledgment along with routing path information to reach the coordinator has to be sent to the coordinator.
- Step 5: Then the coordinator's work is to examine the routing path information.
- Step 6: If there is common path information is present.
- Step 7: then coordinators work is to send the empty packet to two nodes of the tunnel and waits for the acknowledgement.
- Step 8: If the coordinator confirms the tunnel then that routing path will be shared between all other nodes in the network.




Fig. 3: Random Approach Transfer Model.

Table 1: Throughput.

Nodes	20	40	60	80	100
Normal	83.63	87.12	89.23	89.48	90.02
Attack	28.36	35.57	42.63	47.89	58.32
Prevention	82.31	83.41	88.62	87.45	89.85

Step 9: Coordinator will continuously monitor the network.

4 Results and Discussion

We implemented the random approach point transfer model for the simulation, in which a node starts at a random position, waits for the pause time, then moves to a different random position with a speed chosen between 0 m/s and the maximum simulation speed as depicted in Fig. 3



The TUI value which has been found optimum in previous experiments for networks is about five seconds. The performance metrics are obtained through ensemble averaging by simulations, network with a special mobility and connection pattern. The performance of the proposed scheme has been evaluated by metrics like throughput, Packet Loss By malicious node. The coordinator has been selected by using such to identify vulnerable tunnel and informing the details concerning wormhole to all other nodes to enhance the quality of service.

Table 1 and Fig. 4 give the throughput values of adhoc networks in normal situation, attack scenario and during prevention with node counts from 20 to 100 respectively.

Table 2 and Fig. 5 represent the packet delivery rate values of adhoc networks in normal situation, attack scenario and during prevention with node counts from 20 to 100 respectively.

Table 2: Packet delivery rate.

Nodes	20	40	60	80	100
Normal	94.57	87.12	96.12	97.23	99.02
Attack	31.26	35.57	42.63	57.89	68.32
Prevention	94.31	86.41	95.62	96.45	98.85

**Fig. 4:** Throughput.**Fig. 5:** Packet delivery rate.

5 Conclusion

Computing services are developing rapidly, so are the adhoc networks and wireless networks in general. However, there are still security concerns when it comes to wireless adhoc networks due to its vulnerability to numerous attacks. Wormhole detection in adhoc networks is still considered a complicated task as such types of attacks are executed by two malicious nodes inflicting serious harm to networks and nodes. To protect these adhoc networks from wormholes, the solutions proposed in previous literature needed specialized hard wares. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to propose an algorithm which can observe wormholes without needing

any special hard wares. We have used wireless election algorithm coordinator to identify wormhole attack and path. Once detected, other nodes in the network will be notified about the attack for further prevention of attack. This proposal of algorithm was also verified for quality of service parameters such as throughput and packet delivery rate and the results obtained were optimum.

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