Enhancing An AAA Scheme using ID-based Tickets with Anonymity in Future Mobile Communication

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Abstract: In 2011, Moon and Lee proposed an AAA scheme using ID-based tickets with anonymity in future mobile communication in order to provide a ubiquitous communication environment. However, there are some security loopholes that need to be addressed. When malicious attackers steal a mobile device, they can utilize the mobile’s information to access resources or request services. We therefore propose a novel scheme to improve mobile communication protocol to ensure communication security. The proposed scheme achieves low computation, and resists known attacks. The mobile user need not worry about his or her sensitive information being revealed or stolen by malicious attackers.

Keywords: AAA, mutual authentication, lost mobile device attack, networks

1 Introduction

With the rapid growth of mobile communication technology, mobile users can access Internet services via an open network environment. Therefore, a means of ensuring communication security has become an important issue in such a distributed environment. Mutual authentication and key agreement become important methods for communication. Password authentication is a widely used mechanism for authenticating a legitimate user. If a mobile user wants to access the service from a service provider or server, they must pass the authentication process. In traditional password authentication mechanisms [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10], the server side always maintains a verification table, which contains the mobile user’s identity and password. If the verification table is stolen or modified by malicious attackers, the communication system will be compromised.

Recently, several researches [11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19] have proposed approaches for accessing resources in multi-server environments. These protocols can be divided into two types, hash based authentication, and public key based authentication. In 2001, Tsaur et al. [12] proposed a remote user authentication scheme based on RSA cryptosystem and Lagrange interpolating polynomial, for multi-server environments. Lin et al. [13] then proposed a new efficient remote user authentication scheme based on the simple Euclidean geometric properties. In 2011, Moon and Lee [20] proposed an AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) scheme using ID-based tickets with anonymity, for future mobile communication. Moon and Lee used a pre-shared key and digital signature to propose a communication protocol. However, Moon and Lee’s scheme does not protect the mobile user’s information, so malicious attackers can successfully attack the communication system, or steal sensitive information. We, therefore, improve Moon and Lee’s scheme such that the proposed protocol is more secure, and the attacker cannot take advantage of any security loopholes to attack the communication system, or steal sensitive information belonging to the mobile user. Our scheme enhances communication security, and precludes the impersonation of the legal mobile user by malicious attackers. In addition, when the mobile user receives a message from the home Authentication,
Authorization, Accounting server (AAAH) or service provider, the mobile user can perform mutual authentication to detect if the sender is legal. On the other hand, the AAAH or service provider can also verify whether the mobile user is legal. The common architecture for the communication system is shown in Figure 1.

The scenario of the mobile communication environment is described as follows:
(1) Mobile user: The mobile user can use the mobile device to access services in a roaming environment.
(2) AAAH: The AAAH server verifies the user’s identity, and issues the certificate for the legal user as an authorization certificate.
(3) Service provider: The service provider offers a variety of services for legal mobile users.
(4) AAAF: When the mobile user is roaming in foreign network, the foreign Authentication, Authorization, Accounting server (AAAF) will verify the user’s identity, and communicate with the AAAH.

Step 1: Mobile user to AAAH: The mobile user sends the registration messages to the AAAH server. The AAAH computes the registration information and stores it in its database. Finally, the AAAH server sends the registration information to the mobile user.
Step 2: Service provider to AAAH: The service provider submits the registration messages to the AAAH server. The AAAH then issues the secret key for the service provider.
Step 3: Mobile user to AAAH: The mobile user sends the authentication message to the AAAH.
Step 4: AAAH to Mobile user: After receiving the authentication message, the AAAH verifies it, and then issues the authorization certificate to the mobile user.
Step 5: Mobile user to Service provider: When the mobile user wants to request a service, she transmits the request service message and authorization certificate to the service provider.
Step 6: Service provider to AAAH: When the request service message is received, the service provider sends the authentication message to the AAAH.
Step 7: AAAH to Service provider: After verifying the service provider’s legality, the AAAH transmits the mobile user’s information to service provider.
Step 8: Service provider to Mobile user: When the authentication process is passed, the service provider offers the service to the mobile user.
Step 9: Mobile user to AAAF: When the mobile user wants to renew the authorization certificate in a foreign network, she submits the request message to the AAAF.
Step 10: AAAF to AAAH: Once the mobile user passes the authentication process, the AAAF delivers the user information to AAAH via a secure channel. The AAAH generates a new certificate, and sends it back to the AAAF.
Step 11: AAAF to Mobile user: Finally, the AAAF forwards the certificate to the mobile user.

Reviewing Moon and Lee’s scheme, the communication system consists of the mobile device, the AAA server, and the service provider, which together make up a mobile communication environment. In order to achieve more efficient and more secure communication for the communication environment, we list the following requirements:
(1) Mutual authentication: In order to ensure security between the sender and receiver, mutual authentication is crucial. Mutual authentication can prevent known attacks [9,16].
(2) Confidential communication: In the open network, the transmitted data is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Therefore, the communication system must ensure communication security between the sender and receiver [5,6,20].
(3) Anonymity: The mobile communication must guarantee the mobile user’s privacy. Thus, the means of protecting the mobile user’s real identity and related information becomes an important issue [3,4,6,9,20].
(4) Low computation: The mobile communication environment is constructed by mobile device and other participates. Thus, the protocol must have a low computation, such that it is suitable for a mobile device [2,9].
(5) Integrity: The communication message may be deleted, modified, or forged by malicious attackers in an insecure network. Therefore, the communication system must ensure that the authorization certificate cannot be modified or forged [2,5,20].
(6) Session independence: Malicious attackers may
intercept the session key in order to obtain private information from the server or user. To guarantee the security of the communication system, the session key must have a one-time use only. In this way, even if the attacker intercepts the session key, the system security remains unaffected [9,16].

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we point out Moon and Lee’s weaknesses. Our proposed scheme is described in Section 3. In Section 4, the property analysis, and security analysis are presented. We then discuss the performance, and compare with related works in Section 5. Our conclusions are presented in Section 6.

2 The Weaknesses of Moon and Lee’s scheme

Moon and Lee’s scheme has some security loopholes which can be exploited in order to attack the communication system or impersonate legitimate users to access the service. Three such loopholes are:

1. When a mobile user loses his or her mobile device, a malicious attacker can use the mobile device to attack the communication system, or impersonate the legal mobile user to access the service. This is because the session key $SK = PW_i \oplus AT \oplus X_i \oplus Y_i$ and ticket $Ticket = (ID_{AAAH}, Sign_{AAAH}, ID_{AAAF}, Ticket)$ are stored in the mobile device. Malicious attackers can use the mobile device to send the request service message to the service provider. The service provider only verifies the secret value, $h(X_i||Y_i)$. In this way, malicious attackers can impersonate legitimate users to access services [21,22].

2. In Moon and Lee’s scheme, the mobile device needs to compute a lot of exponent operations and asymmetric key encryption. This is not suitable for mobile devices [2,9].

3. In Moon and Lee’s scheme, the symmetric key $KS_{U \rightarrow AAF}$ does not update in each transaction between mobile users and the AAF. If the malicious attackers hold the key, they can use symmetric key $KS_{U \rightarrow AAF}$ to decrypt the transmitted message $E_{KS_{U \rightarrow AAF}}[ID, OTP, AT, Ticket]$, and in this way obtain sensitive information $(ID, OTP, AT, Ticket)$ belonging to the mobile user. Malicious attackers can use $(ID, OTP, AT, Ticket)$ to impersonate a legal user. Thus, Moon and Lee’s scheme doesn’t achieve known key security [23,24].

In this paper, we improve on Moon and Lee’s scheme to achieve more secure and less resource intensive communication. In our scheme, the mobile user applies mutual authentication in the communication system, which ensures secure communication. The mobile device does not store any sensitive information, precluding attacks from lost mobile devices. Our scheme can therefore protect the mobile user’s privacy, and reduce demands placed on the communication system.

3 Our scheme

3.1 Notation

$MU$: the mobile user  
$AAAH$: the home AAA server  
$AAAF$: the foreign AAA server  
$SP$: the service provider  
$ID_i$: the identity of the ith mobile user  
$PW_i$: the password of the ith mobile user  
$ID_{AAAH}$: the anonymous identity of the mobile user  
$S_i, H_i, X_i, Y_i, A_i, F_i, G_i$: the authenticate parameter ($i=1, 2, n$)  
$OTP$: the old and new one-time password, respectively  
$AT$: the old and new authentication time, respectively  
$M_{req}$: the request message of renew certificate  
$Sign_*$: the signature of *  
$KU_*$, $KR$: the public and private keys of *, respectively  
$Lifetime$: the lifetime of ticket or certificate  
$Cert$: the authorization certificate  
$nonce_x$: the nonce generated by x  
$KS_{U \rightarrow AAF}$: the shared symmetric key between mobile user and *  
$SK_{T \rightarrow User}$: the shared session key between mobile user and *  
$E_x[]$: the encryption with key of *  
$h(.)$: a one-way hash function  
$A^2 = B$: check if A is equal to B  
$\oplus$: the XOR operation

3.2 Registration phase

In this phase, we discuss the registration scenario in two parts. In Class 1, the mobile user registers with the AAH to be a legal user. In Class 2, the service provider registers with the AAH to be a legal provider.

Class 1 The mobile user registers to AAH

Step 1: The mobile user selects the identity $ID_i$ and password $PW_i$, then the mobile device computes:

$$A_i = h(ID_i||PW_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

$$X_i = h(A_i||PW_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

After this, the mobile device sends the registration information $A_i$ to the AAH via secure channel.

Step 2: Upon receiving the registration information, the AAH uses secret value $Y_i$ and private key $x$ to compute parameters $F_i$ and $G_i$:

$$F_i = A_i \oplus h(Y_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

$$G_i = h(Y_i||x) \oplus F_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

and then the AAH generates a nonce $nonce_i$ to compute temporary identity $T_{ID}$ for the mobile user:

$$T_{ID} = h(A_i||x||nonce_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)
Finally, the AAAH sends the parameter $F_i$ and temporary identity $T_{ID}$ to the mobile user.

Class 2 The service provider registers to AAAH

Step 1: The service provider sends the identity $ID_{SP}$ to the AAAH via secure channel.

Step 2: On receiving the message, the AAAH computes parameter $P_i$ using private key $x$ and secret value $Y_i$:

$$P_i = h(ID_{SP}||Y_i) \oplus h(x)$$

The AAAH then sends the parameter $P_i$ to the service provider.

### 3.3 Authentication and certificate issues phase

When the mobile user wants to access the service, she needs to go through the verification procedures. In this phase, the mobile user and the AAAH should process mutual authentication to identify their identities. After completing the authentication procedure, the AAAH issues the certificate to the mobile user.

Step 1: The mobile user enters her identity $ID_i$ and password $PW_i$ to the mobile device. The mobile device then computes:

$$A_i = h(ID_i||PW_i)$$

$$X_i' = h(A_i||PW_i)$$

After completing the above step, the mobile device checks whether the parameter $X_i'$ is the same as $X_i$:

$$X_i' = X_i$$

If the above equation holds, the mobile device computes the following parameters:

$$h(Y_i) = F_i \oplus A_i$$

$$C_i = h(A_i \oplus T_{ID})$$

$$KEY' = h(C_i||h(Y_i))$$

$$C_2 = h(KEY'||T_{ID})$$

The mobile device then sends the verification message $(T_{ID}, C_2)$ to the AAAH.

Step 2: On receiving the verification message form mobile user, the AAAH utilizes the temporary identity $T_{ID}$ to find the corresponding information of the mobile user, and computes:

$$F_i' = h(Y_i||x) \oplus G_i$$

$$A_i' = F_i' \oplus h(Y_i)$$

$$C_i' = h(A_i' \oplus T_{ID})$$

$$KEY' = h(C_i'||h(Y_i))$$

After computing the parameters $C_i'$ and $KEY'$, the AAAH computes the ciphertext $C_2'$, and checks whether the ciphertext is the same as $C_2$:

$$C_2' = C_2$$

If the above equation holds, then the verification message and mobile users are valid; otherwise the AAAH terminates this section.

When the mobile user passes the authentication process, the AAAH generates a new nonce, $nonce_i$, and updates the new temporary identity $T_{IDnew}$ of the mobile user for the next verification:

$$T_{IDnew} = h(A_i||x||nonce_i)$$

$$C_3 = h(KEY'||T_{IDnew})$$

The AAAH then issues a certificate to mobile user. The certificate includes the signature of the AAAH, the certificate’s lifetime, $Lifetime$ and ciphertext $C_3$:

$$Sig_1 = Sign_{AAAH}[T_{IDnew}, Lifetime, C_3]$$

$$Cert = (ID_{AAAH}, Sig_1)$$

The AAAH also computes the session key $SK_{U-AAA}$ as follows:

$$SK_{U-AAA} = h(T_{ID}||ID_{AAAH}||C_i'||C_2')$$

Finally, the AAAH utilizes the session key to encrypt a new temporary identity $T_{IDnew}$ and the certificate $Cert$:

$$C_4 = E_{SK_{U-AAA}}[T_{IDnew}, Cert]$$

The AAAH then sends ciphertext $C_4$ to the mobile user.

Step 3: Once the verification messages are received, the mobile device computes the session key, and decrypts the messages:

$$SK_{U-AAA} = h(T_{ID}||ID_{AAAH}||C_i||C_2)$$

$$(T_{IDnew}, Cert) = D_{SK_{U-AAA}}[C_4]$$

The mobile device then computes parameter $C_3'$ to authenticate the AAAH:

$$C_3' = h(KEY'||T_{IDnew})$$

$$C_3' = C_3$$
If the above equation holds, then the AAAH is valid; otherwise the mobile device terminates this transaction. Finally, the mobile user updates the temporary identity \( T_{\text{IDnew}} \) for the next authentication.

### 3.4 Service request phase

When the mobile user wants to request a service, he must pass the authentication phase. The mobile user submits his information and certificate to the service provider. If the mobile user is legal, the service provider only offers the related service to the mobile user.

Step 1: The mobile user enters her identity \( ID_i \) and password \( PW_i \) to the mobile device. The mobile device then computes:

\[
A_i = h(ID_i||PW_i) \tag{30}
\]

\[
X'_i = h(A_i||PW_i) \tag{31}
\]

After completing the above step, the mobile device checks whether the parameter \( X'_i \) is the same as \( X_i \):

\[
X'_i = X_i \tag{32}
\]

If the above holds, the mobile device computes the request service message:

\[
h(Y_i) = F_i \oplus A_i \tag{33}
\]

\[
C_5 = h(A_i \oplus T_{\text{IDnew}}) \tag{34}
\]

\[
\text{KEY}_{\text{U-SP}} = h(T_{\text{IDnew}}||ID_{\text{SP}}||C_5) \tag{35}
\]

\[
C_6 = h(A_i||\text{KEY}_{\text{U-SP}}) \tag{36}
\]

and then sends the message \((T_{\text{IDnew}}, C_6)\) to the service provider.

Step 2: Upon receiving message, the service provider generates nonce, \( \text{nonce}_{\text{SP}} \), and computes parameter \( K \):

\[
K = h(ID_{\text{SP}}||P_i)||\text{nonce}_{\text{SP}} \tag{37}
\]

The service provider sends the \( ID_{\text{SP}} \), the mobile user’s temporary identity \( T_{\text{IDnew}} \), nonce, \( \text{nonce}_{\text{SP}} \) and parameter \( K \) to the AAAH.

Step 3: After receiving the information from service provider, the AAAH checks whether the service provider is valid or not:

\[
P'_i = h(ID_{SP}||Y_i) \oplus h(x) \tag{38}
\]

\[
K = h(ID_{SP}||P'_i)||\text{nonce}_{\text{SP}} \tag{39}
\]

\[
K' = K \tag{40}
\]

If holds, the AAAH uses the temporary identity \( T_{\text{IDnew}} \) to find the mobile user’s information in the database.

\[
F'_i = h(Y_i||x) \oplus G_i \tag{41}
\]

\[
A'_i = F'_i \oplus h(Y_i) \tag{42}
\]

After this, the AAAH generates nonce, \( \text{nonce}_{\text{AAAH}} \), and computes authentication information \( Q_i \) for the service provider.

\[
Q_i = h(P'_i||\text{nonce}_{\text{AAAH}}) \tag{43}
\]

The AAAH generates a new temporary identity \( T_{\text{IDnew}} \) for the mobile user for the next verification:

\[
T'_{\text{IDnew}} = h(A'_i||x||\text{nonce}_i) \tag{44}
\]

Finally, the AAAH uses a secret value to encrypt the message \((h(Y_i), A'_i, \text{Cert}, Q_i, \text{nonce}_{\text{AAAH}}, T'_{\text{IDnew}})\)

\[
w = E_{P'_i}[h(Y_i), A'_i, \text{Cert}, Q_i, \text{nonce}_{\text{AAAH}}, T'_{\text{IDnew}}] \tag{45}
\]

and sends \( w \) to the service provider.

Step 4: Once the messages are received, the service provider decrypts the messages to obtain the mobile user’s information.

\[
(h(Y_i), A'_i, \text{Cert}, Q_i, \text{nonce}_{\text{AAAH}}, T'_{\text{IDnew}}) = D_{P'_i}[w] \tag{46}
\]

\[
Q'_i = h(P'_i||\text{nonce}_{\text{AAAH}}) \tag{47}
\]

\[
Q'_i = Q_i \tag{48}
\]

If the above equation holds, then the AAAH is valid. The service provider then computes the following information to verify the mobile user:

\[
C'_5 = h(A'_i \oplus T_{\text{IDnew}}) \tag{49}
\]

\[
\text{KEY}'_{\text{U-SP}} = h(T_{\text{IDnew}}||ID_{\text{SP}}||C'_5) \tag{50}
\]

\[
C'_6 = h(A_i||\text{KEY}'_{\text{U-SP}}) \tag{51}
\]

\[
C'_7 = E_{\text{KEY}'_{\text{U-SP}}}[S_{\text{U-SP}}] \tag{52}
\]

If the above equation holds, the service provider constructs the session key \( S_{\text{U-SP}} \) between the mobile user and the service provider, and then uses key \( \text{KEY}'_{\text{U-SP}} \) to encrypt the session key \( S_{\text{U-SP}} \).

Finally, the service provider sends \( C_7 \) to the mobile user.

Step 5: Upon receiving the messages from service
provider, the mobile device decrypts the messages, and checks whether or not the messages are valid.

\[
(SK_{U-Sp}) = D_{KEYU-Sp}[C_7] \quad (55)
\]

\[
SK'_{U-Sp} = h(T_{I_{D_{new}}}[ID_{Sp}][KEYU-Sp][C_6]) \quad (56)
\]

\[
SK'_{U-Sp} = SK_{U-Sp} \quad (57)
\]

If the above equation holds, the mobile user uses the session key \(SK'_{U-Sp}\) to encrypt the certificate and service type \(Service - type\).

\[
C_8 = E_{SK'_{U-Sp}}[Cert, Service - type] \quad (58)
\]

The mobile user then sends the message \(C_8\) to the service provider.

Step 6: After receiving the message, the service provider decrypts the message, and checks if the certificate is valid.

\[
(Cert, Service - type) = D_{SK'_{U-Sp}}[C_8] \quad (59)
\]

The service provider then checks if the certificate’s lifetime is valid or not. The service provider offers the service \(offer - service - type\) to the mobile user, then utilizes the session key to encrypt the service and new temporary identity \(T_{I_{D_{new}}}\).

\[
C_9 = E_{SK'_{U-Sp}}[offer - service - type, T_{I_{D_{new}}}] \quad (60)
\]

Finally, the service provider sends the ciphertext \(C_9\) to the mobile user.

### 3.5 Certificate renewal from foreign network phase

When the mobile user roams in a foreign area, and the certificate has expired, or she wants to renew the certificate, she must pass the authentication phase. If the mobile user obtains the new certificate, she can then request a service in a foreign network.

Step 1: The mobile user enters her identity \(ID_i\) and password \(PW_i\) to the mobile device. The mobile device then computes:

\[
A_i = h(ID_i || PW_i) \quad (61)
\]

\[
X_i' = h(A_i || PW_i) \quad (62)
\]

After completing the above step, the mobile device checks whether the parameter \(X_i'\) is the same as \(X_i\):

\[
X_i' = X_i \quad (63)
\]

Then the mobile user is valid. The mobile device generates a certificate renewal message \(M_{req}\) and computes:

\[
h(Y_i) = F_i \oplus A_i \quad (64)
\]

\[
C_{10} = h(A_i \oplus T'_{I_{D_{new}}}) \quad (65)
\]

\[
KEY = h(C_{10} || h(Y_i)) \quad (66)
\]

\[
C_{11} = h(KEY || T'_{I_{D_{new}}}) \quad (67)
\]

and then sends the message \((T'_{I_{D_{new}}}, C_{11}, M_{req})\) to the AAAF.

Step 2: Upon receiving the message, the AAAF verifies whether the mobile user is valid:

\[
F_i' = h(Y_i || x) \oplus G_i \quad (68)
\]

\[
A_i' = F_i' \oplus h(Y_i) \quad (69)
\]

\[
C_{10}' = h(A_i' \oplus T'_{I_{D_{new}}}) \quad (70)
\]

\[
KEY' = h(C_{10}' || h(Y_i)) \quad (71)
\]

\[
C_{11}' = h(KEY' || T'_{I_{D_{new}}}) \quad (72)
\]

After computing the parameter \(C_{11}'\), the AAAH checks whether the parameter is the same as the authentication message \(C_{11}\); otherwise the AAAF terminates this section.

\[
C_{11}' = C_{11} \quad (73)
\]

If the above equation holds, the AAAF sends the message \((T'_{I_{D_{new}}}, A_i', C_{10}', C_{11}', M_{req})\) to the AAAH via secure channel.

Step 3: The AAAH generates a new temporary identity \(T'_{I_{D_{new}}}\), new lifetime \(LifeTime_{new}\) and new certificate \(Cert_{new}\) for the mobile user:

\[
T'_{I_{D_{new}}} = h(A_i' || x || nonce_i) \quad (74)
\]

\[
Sig_{2} = SignAAA\{T'_{I_{D_{new}}}, LifeTime_{new}\} \quad (75)
\]

\[
Cert_{new} = \{ID_{AAA}, Sign\} \quad (76)
\]

The AAAH then sends the new certificate \(Cert_{new}\) and new temporary identity \(T'_{I_{D_{new}}}\) to the AAAF via secure channel.

Step 4: The AAAF computes the parameter \(C_{12}\), and uses the mobile user’s master key \(KEY'\) to encrypt the new temporary identity \(T'_{I_{D_{new}}}\), the new certificate \(Cert_{new}\) and parameter \(C_{13}\).

\[
C_{12} = h(A_i' || ID_{AAA} || KEY') \quad (77)
\]

\[
C_{13} = E_{KEY'}[T'_{I_{D_{new}}}, Cert_{new}, C_{12}] \quad (78)
\]

Finally, the AAAF sends the message \(C_{13}\) back to the mobile user.

Step 5: Upon receiving the message, the mobile user
utilizes the master key $KEY$ to decrypt the message, and authenticates the AAAF:
\[(T'_{ID_{new}},Cert_{new},C_{12}) = D_{KEY}[C_{13}]\] (79)
\[C'_{1} = h(A_{i}||ID_{AAAIF}||KEY)\] (80)
\[C'_{12} = C_{12}\] (81)

If the above equation holds, the mobile user ensures the AAAF is valid. The mobile user then updates the new temporary identity $T'_{ID_{new}}$ and new certificate $Cert_{new}$ for the next authentication.

4 Analysis

Our scheme can withstand different types of attacks, and enhances the communication system’s security. Even if the mobile device is lost, the security of the mobile user’s information is not affected. In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme, and discuss other possible attacks.

4.1 Property Analysis

4.1.1 Confidential communication

In wireless or wire networks, communication security is the most important issue for any user. In our scheme, the communication system protects confidential messages by a one-way hash function, and uses the symmetric key. In the authentication and certificate issue phase, the AAAH and mobile device use the session key $SK_{U-AAAH} = h(T_{ID}||ID_{AAAIF}||C'_{1}||C'_{2})$ to ensure communication security. The session key $SK_{U-AAAH}$ is composed of the AAAH’s identity $ID_{AAAIF}$, two secret parameters $C'_{1}$ and $C'_{2}$, (where $C'_{1} = h(A_{i} \oplus T_{ID})$ and $C'_{2} = h(KEY'||T_{ID})$) and a temporary identity $T_{ID}$. Even if an attacker intercepts the session key, the attacker cannot use the session key to discover the mobile user’s identity $ID_{i}$, or password $PW_{i}$. No one can construct the same session key to impersonate the mobile user.

4.1.2 User’s Privacy

For every service request and authentication, the mobile user uses the temporary identity $T_{ID}$ and ciphertext $C_{2}$ to request a service or authenticate with the AAAH or service provider. However, our scheme also precludes a mobile device from storing the mobile user’s information. The mobile device only stores the mobile user’s temporary identity $T_{ID}$, and parameter $F_{i}$. The malicious attacker picks up a mobile device that does not contain any of the mobile user’s sensitive information. Since the ciphertext $C_{2}$, where $(C_{2} = h(KE_{Y}||T_{ID}))$, is protected by the user’s master key $KEY$, $KEY = h(C_{1}||h(Y_{i}))$, $C_{1} = h(A_{i} \oplus T_{ID})$, $A_{i} = h(ID_{i}||PW_{i})$ even if the malicious attacker intercepts the message $(T_{ID}, C_{2})$ the attacker cannot identify the user’s real identity $ID_{i}$ or password $PW_{i}$. So, the system rigorously controls the security of communication and authentication for the mobile user’s privacy. When the mobile user requests a service, the service provider cannot reveal the mobile user’s real identity $ID_{i}$.

4.1.3 Low Computation

Since mobile devices are not suitable for heavy computation, the system must have the characteristics of a lightweight operation. In our scheme, the mobile device only performs a one-way hash function, or symmetric encryption, so our scheme is suitable for a mobile device.

4.2 Attack Analysis

4.2.1 Resist Stolen Verification Table

If a malicious attacker invades the AAAH to steal the verification table, the attackers cannot use the information $(F_{i}, G_{i}, T_{ID})$. If a malicious attacker invades the AAAH to steal the verification table, the attackers cannot use the information attacker obtains the information $(F_{i}, G_{i}, T_{ID})$, they cannot utilize above parameters to compute secret value $Y_{i}$ and $x(h(Y_{i})|x) = F_{i} \oplus G_{i}$. In our scheme, a malicious attacker does not know the AAAH’s private key $x$ because the secret value $h(Y_{i})|x$ involves two unknown parameters $Y_{i}$ and $x$. Our scheme does not store the mobile user’s information at the AAAH or service provider, and the mobile device does not store mobile users’ sensitive information. On the other hand, no sensitive information belonging to a mobile user is stored at the AAAH. Our scheme can prevent the theft of the verification table.

4.2.2 Resist stolen mobile device attack

In our improved scheme, if a malicious attacker obtains the mobile user’s information, the attacker cannot easily obtain any parameter without passing self-authentication. Even if the malicious attacker extracts the parameters $(F_{i}, A_{i}, T_{ID})$, since the identity $ID_{i}$ and password $PW_{i}$ are protected by hash function, the attacker still cannot obtain...
any sensitive information (such as IDi, PWi or AAAH’s secret key x) from those parameters. Notably, the malicious attacker doesn’t know the mobile user’s identity IDi and password, PWi and the parameter is always protected by two unknown factors. Therefore, no-one can use a stolen mobile device to pass the authentication without the mobile user’s password and identity.

4.2.3 Resist impersonation attack

Upon receiving the authentication message, the AAAH utilizes the temporary identity to find the corresponding information about the mobile user, and computes (F1, A1, C1, C2) to authenticate whether the mobile user is valid or not. A malicious attacker cannot impersonate a legal user to transmit an authentication message (TID, C2). The parameter C2 = h(KEY || TID) = h(C1 || h(Yi)). C1 = h(Ai ⊕ TID) includes two unknown parameters Ai and secret value h(Yi) thus, the malicious attacker cannot impersonate a legal mobile user to request a service, or to attack our system.

4.2.4 Resist ID-theft attack

In our scheme, the mobile user’s real identity IDi is not known by other mobile users, the service provider, or the AAA server. The proposed scheme provides a temporary identity TID as the mobile user’s identity to communicate with the service provider or the AAAH. In the registration phase, the mobile user uses the parameter Ai to register to be a legal mobile user. The AAAH uses the parameter Ai as the mobile user’s registration information. So, the network control center does not know the mobile user’s real identity IDi. Thus, our scheme can resist an ID-theft attack, even if the attacker intrudes upon the service provider or AAAH.

4.2.5 Resist legal user stealing the server’s private key

In our scheme, the mobile user only owns the temporary identity TID and the parameter F1, so the mobile user doesn’t know the AAAH’s sensitive information. Even if the mobile user invades the AAAH to steal the verification table and obtain information (F1, G1, TID), the mobile user cannot use information (F1, G1, TID) to reveal the AAAH’s private key x. The mobile user can utilize F1 to compute h(Yi) = F1 ⊕ G1. However, there are two unknown factors, F1 and x, so h(Yi) = F1 ⊕ G1 . On the other hand, if a legal mobile user steals information (F1, G1, TID), it will not reveal the AAAH’s private key x. So, our scheme not only resists legal mobile users from stealing the server’s private key, but also prevents the possibility of an internal attack.

4.2.6 Resist Replay Attack

Since the established session key SKi−AAAH = h(TID || IDiAAAH || C1′ || C2′) includes the mobile user’s temporary identity TID, and the TID is updated for each transaction, a malicious attacker intercepts the authentication message (TID, C2) that can’t perform the replay attack. The old temporary identity TID will be replaced by the new temporary identity TIDnew. Thus, the malicious attacker cannot use the old message to achieve the replay attack.

5 Discussions

In this section, we compare our scheme with others using the six properties and six attacks for evaluating communication systems, as shown in Table 1. It is easy to see that our scheme can achieve the listed security requirements of section 1, and resist known attacks. Therefore, our scheme is superior to other schemes. In Table 2, we compare the computing cost with Moon and Lee’s scheme, since the computing cost of the exponential and asymmetric encryption is heavier than that of hash function. Therefore, our computation cost is lower than their scheme.

| Table 2: Computation cost comparison between Moon and Lee’s scheme and our scheme |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                  | Moon and Lee [20] | Our scheme       |
| Registration phase | 2 Td + 2 Tsym + 1 Tsig | 7 Td            |
| Authentication & certificate issues phase | 2 Tm + 10 Texp + 1 Tsig | 15 Td + 1 Tsym + 1 Tsig |
| Service request phase | 1 Td + 1 Tsym + 1 Tmul + 1 Tsig | 13 Td + 4 Tsym      |
| Certificate renewal from foreign network phase | 2 Td + 3 Tsym + 2 Tmul + 9 Texp + 2 Tsig | 13 Td + 1 Tsym + 1 Tsig |
| Total cost        | 5 Td + 6 Tsym + 2 Tm + 19 Texp + 3 Tsig | 48 Td + 6 Tsym + 2 Tsig |

Td: the time of one-way hash function operation
Tsym: the time of symmetric encryption/decryption operation
Tary: the time of asymmetric encryption/decryption operation
Tmul: the time of multiplication operation
Texp: the time of exponential operation
Tsig: the time of signing a signature
6 Conclusions

We have improved the security of Moon and Lee’s scheme. Although Moon and Lee claim their scheme can resist various known attacks, we have shown that the scheme is indeed vulnerable to mobile device attack. In Moon and Lee’s scheme, malicious attackers can impersonate any legal user in order to log into the AAAH, or service provider, without, at any time, knowing the mobile user’s password.

In summary, our scheme has the following characteristics:
(1) Our scheme can achieve mutual authentication to ensure communication security between the mobile user, service provider, and AAAH.
(2) Even if malicious attackers steal the mobile user’s mobile device, they cannot reveal the mobile user’s sensitive information via mobile device.
(3) Our scheme uses the digital signature mechanism to protect the mobile user’s information from being stolen or modified.

Our scheme prevents a legal mobile user from stealing the AAAH’s private key, and precludes the possibility of an insider attack.

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